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is trying to discourage the use of confessions in evidence unless ab-
solutely necessary. This would prevent the non-discovery or loss of
probative evidence available prior to trial, and the unwarranted re-
liance47 by state prosecutors upon confessions to secure convictions.
While there is much to be said for the decisions excluding coerced
confessions, there are those who feel that known criminals are being
afforded too much protection, in view of the constantly increasing
national crime rate. The sentiments of this group are well summarized
by the attack of Senator Ervin of North Carolina on the merits of the
Mallory decision:
"Frankly, I believe that in recent years enough has been done
for those who murder, rape, and rob; and that it is about time
for Congress to do something for those who do not wish to be
murdered, or raped, or robbed."
48
The American system is accusatorial, rather than inquisitorial, 49
and an accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted. The law
assures that he will be treated humanely, and "that no more force will
be exercised upon him than sufficient to bring him to court .... In
other words, a man ... is entitled to freedom from molestation, to food,
water, opportunity to sleep, and humane treatment generally. He also
may employ 'counsel .... The prisoner may be visited ... by rela-
tives and friends." 50 Therefore, it seems that coerced confessions must
be excluded in order to prevent fundamental injustices5 l to all per-
sons accused of participation in crime, even though this may pro-




The term "Political Question" has generally been reserved by the
courts for use when an issue is "of a peculiarly political nature and
therefore not meet for judicial determination."' In this manner, the
courts decide that they are without "jurisdiction," although a more
precise statement would be that the "issue is non-justiciable." One
"In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 609 (1948), the dissenting opinion stated that
"the ... undisputed facts left comparatively little need for such a confession .
48io4 Cong. Rec. 17085 (daily ed. Aug. ig, 1958).
"Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
nReport of Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law, 1 Am. J. of Police
Science 575, 576 (1930).
r4See note iG supra; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
2Colegrove v. Green, 328 US. 549, 552 (1946).
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of the areas that the Supreme Court has consistently held to be politi-
cal in nature and therefore not justiciable is the exercise of control by
state legislatures over the apportionment,2 districting,3 creation, 4 or
diminution5 of territories within the state. Nevertheless, a realign-
ment suit presents a complex problem when the plaintiff alleges that
the state action constitutes a violation of some provision of the United
States Constitution.
This problem confronted the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.6 In this class suit brought
by Negroes in the federal District Court of Alabama against several
defendants,7 it was alleged that a realignment of the boundaries of
the City of Tuskegee deprived the plaintiffs of their privilege to vote
in the municipal elections of that city. The plaintiffs maintained that
this realignment violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.8
The District Court, in dismissing the complaint upon defendants'
motion, stated that it had "no control over, no supervision over, and
no power to change any boundaries of municipal corporations fixed
by a duly convened and elected legislative body acting for the people
2
Ibid.; Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956), aff'd per curiam,
352 U.S. 991 (1957).
'Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
See also Wise v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269 (1884).
"Trusts of great moment.., are confided to such municipalities; and, in turn,
they are required to perform many important duties, as evidenced by the terms of
their respective charters. Authority to effect such objects is conferred by the legis-
lature; but it ... does not divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the
district which it possessed before the charter was granted. Unless the Constitution
otherwise provides, the legislature still has authority to amend the charter of such
a corporation, enlarge or diminish its power, extend or limit its boundaries, divide
the same into two or more, consolidate two or more into one, overrule its action
whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish the munici-
pality altogether, in the legislative discretion." Commissioners of Laramie County v.
Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1876); see Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 16, (1907) (consolidation).
'City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas CO., 250 U.S. 394 (1919) •
'270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
:Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958). Defendants: Light-
foot, Ma)or; Edwards, Gregory, Olsin, Thompson and Vaughan, Members of the
Cit1 Council of Tuskegee; Hodnett, Chief of Police; Leslie, Huddleston, Dyson,
Thompson and Guthrie, Members of the Board of Revenue of Macon County;
Hornsby, Sheriff of Macon County; Varner, Judge of Probate of Macon County;
City of Tuskegee, Municipal Corporation.
"[T]he Act in question excludes 99 per cent of the 4oo Negro voters from the
City of Tuskegee and ... not one single one of the 6oo white voters .... " 270 F.2d at
6o8. In addition to the denial of the right to vote, plaintiffs alleged that they had
been deprived of police protection, street improvements, and the right to partici-
pate in municipal affairs. 27o F.2d at 595. Only the denial of voting rights is con-
sidered in this comment.
i 96o]
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in the State of Alabama." 9 In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit relied on South v. Peters,10 which held that "the Federal
Constitution does not take from states the right to set up their own in-
ternal organizations and prescribe the manner of state elections.""
Applying this principle to the Gomillion case, the court decided that
"in the absence of any racial or class discrimination appearing on the
face of the statute, the courts will not hold an act, which decreases the
area of a municipality by changing its boundaries, to be invalid as
violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution .... ,:2
In the dissenting and specially-concurring opinions, two questions
are raised which must be considered in an analysis of the problem:
(i) What attitude have the courts developed toward political ques-
tions? (2) What effect does the alleged violation of constitutional
amendments have upon the non-justiciability of the issue?
It is fairly well settled that the theoretical basis of a political
question is the "Separation of Powers" concept of the Constitution. 3
This concept stems from the construction of the Constitution, i.e., the
separation of articles I, II and III, rather than from the substantive
matter therein. In Kelley v. Marron,14 the New Mexico Supreme Court
summarized the doctrine as applied in the United States in these
words:
"Our Constitution, and in fact the Constitution of the United
States and each of the states, have provided for three great
branches of government, all of equal dignity and power with-
in their proper spheres, and each independent of the other.
Certain duties of government are confided to each of these de-
"Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
1089 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (upheld the county
organization in Georgia).
1id. at 68o.
227o F.2d at 598.
"Post, The Supreme Court and Political Questions, The John Hopkins Uni-
versity Studies 12 (1936). See Field, The Doctrine of Political Question in the Federal
Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 511 (1924); Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L.
Rev. 296 (1925); Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 6ot (1957). But see Finkelstein,
Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1924) supplemented by Finkelstein,
Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1925).
The derivation of the separation of powers concept has been traced to the Eng-
lish common law (Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 6o (1957)), and even to Aristotle
(II Pound, Jurisprudence 323 (1959)). Thus, although the doctrine was apparently
introduced to the United States by our Constitution, it well antedated that docu-
ment.
1"21 N.M. 239, 153 Pac. 262 (1915).
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partments, which it is required and authorized to exercise, with-
in constitutional limitations, without any interference from
either of the others. Upon the legislative branch of government
is cast the duty of enacting such laws as are deemed calculated
to promote the prosperity and happiness of the people and
provide for the general welfare. The judicial department is
created and endowed with the power to construe and interpret
the laws and administer justice, between state and citizen,
citizen and citizen, or citizen and stranger.... The executive
executes the laws, and performs certain duties which the Con-
stitution and law impose upon it.,
If the separation of powers doctrine is engrained within our Con-
stitution as a fundamental barrier to despotism, any case or contro-
versy in which a court has occasion to limit this doctrine must be
adjudicated with careful regard for the resultant manifestations of the
decision.'6 Absolute separation is obviously impossible, but at least
the initial separation as set forth in the Constitution must be main-
tained; and, to this end, each branch must have plenary powers within
its own sphere of delegated activity. It would appear that the judicial
branch has attempted to respect this view, for whenever it has been
asked to decide a question in this area, it has refused by characterizing
the issue as political.1
7
The United States Supreme Court has established the following
subjects as political: attempts to enforce the constitutional guarantee
to the states of a "republican form of government"; Is questions in-
volving relations with the Indian tribes; 19 questions involving the
commencement and termination of war; 20 decisions regarding inter-
2Id. at 263.
1'3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States 1616 (2d ed. 1929).
171d. at 1326-27.
'"Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Ohio ex rel. Davis
v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U. S. 118 (1912); Georgia v. Staunton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Luther v. Borden,
.18 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1848). But see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (19go); Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
""Plenary authority over tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one,
not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government." Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (9o3); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 3o
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal
Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 511 (1924).
2
1
Brown v. Hiatts, 82 US. (15 Wall.) 177 (1872); United States v. One Hundred
and Twenty-Nine Packages, 27 Fed. Cas. 284 (No 15941) (E.D. Mo. 1862). For addi-
tional cases see Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 490 nn.24 & 25.
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pretation of treaties; 21 determinations of jurisdiction over territory; 22
recognition of states; 23 and the disposition of aliens. 24 The functions
performed by state governments with regard to legislative apportion-
ment, consolidation, redistricting and dissolution have also been held
to be political questions by the Supreme Court.25 These decisions, in
recognizing the inability and undesirability of the federal judiciary
exercising authority in an area which is constitutionally left to an-
other body, establish unequivocably that any remedy for problems in
these areas must be forthcoming from the other body.26
Even though the Supreme Court has decided that the redistrict-
ing of municipalities is a political question, the Court must still de-
termine whether the alleged violation of a Constitutional provision
may convert a political-and hence non-justiciable-issue into a justici-
1 Terlinden v. Ames, 184, U.S. 270, (1902); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635
(1853); Ware v.Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199 (1796); Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas.
784 (No. 13799) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff'd 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
'In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (18go);
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). For additional cases and discussion see
3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, 1329 (2d ed. 1929); Field,
The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 494
(1924)-
'Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852); Agency of Canadian Car &
Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 253 Fed. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
""It is pertinent to observe that any policy towards aliens is vitally and intri-
cately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.
Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government
as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 485, 492 (1924).
"See notes 2-5 supra; Lewis, Legislative Appointment and the Federal Courts,
71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1958); Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593 (1957); See also, Com-
ment, 8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 190 (1951).
""The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages...." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955)- "[W]e do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation
nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare." Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). "If there is political
wrong, the remedy is in the State Legislature...." South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp.
672, 68o (N.D. Ga. 195o). "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
must resort to the polls, not to the courts." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)-
"In determining whether a question falls within that [political question] cate-
gory, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to
the action of political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominant considerations." Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433,454 (1939)-
In many instances state courts have exercised dominion over problems in these
areas and based their decisions on unreasonable exercise of power. Lewis, Legisla-
tive Appointment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1066 (1958).
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able one. In considering this question, it would appear that two basic
theories may be used to understand and reconcile the Supreme Court
decisions concerning the problem.27
The first of the theories might be called the "absolute political
question" concept. It stems from the separation of powers doctrine
and therefore adheres to the proposition that a bona fide political
question is per se non-justiciable, regardless of whether an asserted
constitutional violation is strong, weak or nonexistent. This bona fide
or truly political question can never come within the dominion of the
federal courts. Such questions are normally reserved to the "political"
branches of the government, i.e., the legislative and executive; 28 they
involve non-justiciable issues and have been characterized as political
questions by the Supreme Court. To assert jurisdiction over these
functions of government would invade a constitutional delegation of
power and violate the separation of powers doctrine. 29
On the other hand, those non-justiciable issues which have not
previously been characterized as political questions may become jus-
ticiable because of the violation of a constitutional guarantee. The
court must balance the basis for the non-justiciability with the right
which has been violated 3 0 The dissenting opinion in Gomillion3l sug-
-For the purpose of this comment, it is assumed that reconciliation is desired,
although it is recognized that the Supreme Court occasionally overrules a prior de-
cision. The desirability of reconciliation and its correlative, stare decisis, is pointedly
illuminated by Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,_
669 (194.1)- "[T]he instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years
ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted
railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."
'Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev.
54, 84 (1931).
a2Examples of acts which are truly political: the seating of new members of a
legislature; the issuance of a declaration of war; the signing of a treaty; and the
issuance of mandamus to an executive official to do a discretionary act. Many
authorities separate the discretionary act category from other political questions.
See, e.g., Field, The Doctrine- of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn.
L. Rev. 485 (1924).
31t is in this area that the explanation is found for such cases as Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (i954) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
In Brown, the issue was education; in Smith, voting in a state primary. Both of these
would seem to have been reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Neither,
however, was called a political question and both were decided by the Supreme
Court in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus, it would seem that in Brown the Supreme
Court held that the reserved rights of the state to educate must yield to the over-
powering equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Note, however, that
when the rights of a class to be on a jury conflict with the privilege of peremptory
challenges, the right to challenge generally wins as the more crucial right unless
the one asserting the right is a member of that class. 31 Am. Jur. Jury § 113 (1958).
See note 32 infra.
3127o F.2d at 602.
i96o]
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gests that certain areas normally reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment fall within the purview of the federal judiciary when the
violation of a specific constitutional provision is asserted. It appears
that the dissent fails to recognize this important distinction; that is,
that some issues present truly political questions and are forever non-
justiciable, whereas other types of merely non-justiciable issues may
become justiciable because of the violation of a constitutional pro-
vision. Thus, under the absolute political question concept, the prior
characterization by the Supreme Court is determinative, and only if
the nonjusticiable issue has not been characterized as a truly political
question is there an opportunity for balancing.
32
Under the second theory, which might be labeled the "superior
right" concept, the presence or absence of prior characterization by
the Supreme Court has no bearing whatsoever on the result. Under this
view, all political questions are relative; and if the' attack upon the
political question is strong enough, the non-justiciable nature of the
issue must yield to the justiciable right being asserted.33 If a question
is strongly political, e.g., the power of Congress to seat its members,
34
or the wisdom of decisions of Congress concerning expenditures,35 the
issue may only be attacked if the violation of a vital constitutional pro-
vision is alleged.36 The powers of the judiciary with regard to these
issues is limited to deciding whether Congress had the power to pass
a particular Act, rather than looking to the propriety of the Act.3 7 To
-"Another possibility is suggested by Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In
that case, the issue had been categorized as non-state action by Grovey, v. Town-
send, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Smith overruled Grovey and characterized the issue as
state action. It would seem that political questions might be subject to similar
treatment. See note 27 supra.
'This is not a novel idea; see 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United
States § 855 (2d ed. 1929). It is also suggested by one passage from Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946), wherein Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "the basis for
the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity."
Note that this is the same procedure used under the "absolute political ques-
tion" theory when the issue has not been characterized as political.
3"Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. x18, 147 (1912); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1848).
1 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
"'Compare Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), wherein it was held that a
physician did not have a sufficient interest-when based on danger to his patients'
health-to attack a statute which prohibited professional advice in the use of contra-
ceptives, with Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), in which it was said that
persons defending a breach of racial restrictions suit could assert the interest of
unidentified non-Caucasians.
8E.g., if Congress were empowered to pass Act "A" and subsequently elected to
pass Act "A," no complaint could be heard by the judiciary unless some other
superior right were asserted.
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decide whether the power existed, the courts must look to either the
Act itself or its application. 3s If a constitutional provision is violated,
and this violation concerns a vital right, the court may assert juris-
diction. In this way a question which has been non-justiciable becomes
justiciable. When the question involved is less intensive in its political
nature, the violation of a lesser right may occasion the acceptance by
the court of jurisdiction. Such a balancing is not new in the law.39
It would appear that the two concepts advanced are distinguish-
able, and it is this distinction that could determine the result in the
Gorillion case. Under the "absolute political question" concept, the
determination of the existence of a political question would be crucial.
Since redistricting was characterized as a political question by Wood
v. Broom 40 and Colegrove v. Green,41 the Supreme Court would have
no difficulty classifying the act of the Alabama Legislature as political.
Once this is ascertained, no further inquiry need be made, and the
court should refuse jurisdiction. Under the "superior right" concept,
however, the strength of the political nature of the question must be
balanced against the strength of the constitutional provision allegedly
violated. In the Gomillion case, an individual right of the most
fundamental nature, i.e., the right of a citizen to vote,42 must be
balanced against one of the most fundamental political questions,
i.e., the right of a state legislature to redistrict its municipal corpora-
tions.43 When two fundamental principles conflict, as in this in-
stance, the "superior right" concept requires the court to determine
which is superior, rather than permitting it to dodge behind a cate-
gorical name which in itself decides the issue.
44
-To some extent, this is a matter of semantics. An act by itself is merely a
group of words. No meaning exists until its results are considered. This, in essence, is
application of the Act. Therefore, the two are inseparable.
-4Sec, e.g., McClintock, Equity, 189 (2d ed. 1948) (balancing equities); Prosser,
Torts, 122 (2d ed. 1955) (balancing gravity against utility).
' 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
"128 U.S. 549 (1946).
' 'The [Fifteenth] Amendment bans racial discrimination in voting by both
state and nation. It thus establishes a national policy, obviously applicable to the
right of Negroes not to be discriminated against as voters in elections to determine
governmental policies or to select public officials, national, state, or local." Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467 (953). "The United States is a constitutional democracy.
Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected
officials without restriction by any State because of race." Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 664 (1944)-
'-See note 4 supra.
""Such a balancing has been done with regard to other questions considered
by the Supreme Court. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 657 (1944), the Court
said, "Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may
deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the
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The fact that the court in this instance must look behind the
words of the act to find the disenfranchisement based upon color does
not preclude judicial determination of the question. As summarized
by the syllabus in Norris v. Alabama,45 "Whenever a conclusion of law
of a state court as to a federal right is so intermingled with findings of
fact that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon this Court
to analyze the facts in order that the enforcement of the federal right
may be assured."
46
It would appear, therefore, that a distinction may be found be-
tween Colegrove v. Green,47 Wood v. Broom48 and the instant case. In
Colegrove, the Court dismissed a complaint attacking as unconstitu-
tional gross disparities in the population of Illinois' congressional
districts; and in Wood, the Court held that, absent a federal statute,
the state need not create congressional districts composed of compact
and contiguous territory having as nearly as practicable the same
number of inhabitants. Thus, in both Colegrove and Wood the as-
serted violations were not of such import as to overthrow the reserved
rights of the states, whereas in Gomillion the individual right is so
fundamental that the state right to redistrict may well fall before it.
As the Supreme Court stated in Lane v. Wilson,49 "The [Fifteenth]
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effec-
tively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although
the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race."
5 0
If the forthcoming decision of the Supreme Court,51 handed down
after reviewing the Gomillion case, is considered in light of either of
the theories presented, the previously decided cases of the Supreme
Court may be reconciled. A decision in the plaintiff's favor will rep-
resent nothing more than another instance in which a state right
has conflicted with and given way before a superior federal right,
while a decision in favor of the defendants will only reflect a strict
adherence to the prior characterization made by the Court.
ROBERT J. BERCHIL
United States Constitution...." In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937),
the Supreme Court remarked in upholding Georgia's poll tax that the state's freedom
to "condition suffrage as it deems appropriate" is subject to the provisions of the
Federal Constitution.
"5294 U.S. 587 (1935).
"8Ibid.
"1328 U.S. 549 (1946).
48287 U.S. 1 (1932).
'307 U.S. 268 (1939).
51Id. at 275.
mCert. granted, 362 U.S. 916 (196o).
